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AFTER RAPANOS V. UNITED STATES:
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION NEEDED TO
DEFINE “NAVIGABLE WATERS” UNDER
THE CLEAN WATER ACT
Jenny L. Routheaux*
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress’s landmark water pollution legislation, the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”), has been the major cause of the successful cleanup of many of our
nation’s rivers, lakes, coastlines, and wetlands over the past thirty years.1
However, the scope of the waters covered by the CWA, more specifically
termed “navigable waters,” has come into question with recent United States
Supreme Court decisions, especially the 2006 decision Rapanos v. United
States.2  Although the term “navigable waters” in the CWA usually has been
defined broadly to extend beyond navigable-in-fact waters,3 the Rapanos deci-
sion seems to narrow the scope of waters covered under the CWA.  However,
no Supreme Court majority provides a test for defining “navigable waters,”
and, as such, the scope of the CWA is now unclear.  Because of this uncer-
tainty, many wetlands and tributaries in the United States, especially those in
the arid western region, may not receive CWA protection, thereby jeopardizing
the continued existence of these important waters and their valuable environ-
mental functions.
Accordingly, this Note provides a brief historical account of the CWA
before discussing the major cases that analyzed “navigable waters” prior to
Rapanos.  Next, it examines the various opinions in Rapanos and two subse-
quent Ninth Circuit cases that applied Rapanos.  Finally, this Note analyzes the
possibility of new federal regulations clarifying the scope of “navigable
* J.D. Candidate, May 2008, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas.
1 Interpreting the Effect of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Recent Decision in the Joint Cases of
Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on “The Waters of
the United States”:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. of Fish, Wildlife, and Water of the S.
Comm. on Env’t & Public Works, 109th Cong. (Aug. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Hearing] (state-
ment of Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton), available at  http://epw.senate.gov/hearing_state-
ments.cfm?id=260397.
2 Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
3 Traditionally, navigable-in-fact waters are those waters that are actually capable of use for
trade or travel, or as “highways for commerce.”  The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870);
see also infra Part II.B.
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waters,” the better option of new congressional legislation, and the benefits of
such legislation for the arid western region of the United States.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND
WETLANDS PROTECTION
The CWA, as we know it today, originated with the 1972 amendments to
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.4  A House sponsor of the bill stated
that this was “the most comprehensive and far-reaching water pollution bill [the
House had] ever drafted . . . .”5  Specifically, the primary objective of the CWA
was “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation’s waters.”6  The Supreme Court even noted the expansive nature of
the CWA by stating that it was “a comprehensive program for controlling and
abating water pollution.”7  However, although the CWA’s scope may be broad,
the extent to which it covers wetlands is uncertain after a series of United States
Supreme Court cases.8
A. History of the Clean Water Act
The origins of federal water pollution control arose out of a concern for
navigability in the nation’s waterways and can be traced back to the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899.9  This Act prohibited obstructions to navigability in
waters of the United States and forbade excavation or filling of a lake or
stream.10  Although the Rivers and Harbors Act was initially intended as a tool
for aiding navigation, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Republic Steel
Corp.,11 held that the Act also could address steel mill discharges.12
Subsequently, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
of 1948, which more directly targeted water pollution.13  This Act’s primary
purpose was to establish water quality standards, and it encouraged the states to
develop and enforce water pollution control laws.14  However, “[t]he problems
caused by water pollution actually became more pronounced during the life of
the 1948 Act.”15  For instance, in 1969, the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland
caught on fire due to a coating of industrial waste;16 Lake Erie was declared
4 JOEL M. GROSS & LYNN DODGE, CLEAN WATER ACT 1 (2005).
5 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT OF 1972, at 369 (1973)
(statement by Rep. Mizell).
6 Clean Water Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
7 Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 37 (1975).
8 See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
9 C. Peter Goplerud III, Water Pollution Law:  Milestones from the Past and Anticipation of
the Future, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Fall 1995, at 7, 7.
10 Id.
11 United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960).
12 GROSS & DODGE, supra note 4, at 5 (citing Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482).
13 Id.
14 Goplerud, supra note 9, at 7.
15 Id.
16 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159,
174 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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“dead” from pollution; and the Hudson River was closed to fishing.17  Follow-
ing these and other serious realizations of the extent of water pollution, Con-
gress, and perhaps most of the country, experienced an environmental
awakening in the early 1970s.18
Thus, Congress enacted the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act, known today as the CWA.  The major purpose of the CWA
was “to establish a comprehensive long-range policy for the elimination of
water pollution.”19  Congress also had the specific goals of making the waters
of the United States fishable and swimmable by 1983 and reaching zero dis-
charge of pollutants by 1985.20  Although the government has yet to meet these
goals, the CWA has significantly improved the quality of America’s water-
ways.  In fact, previously
[m]any rivers and beaches were little more than open sewers.  Enactment of the
CWA dramatically improved the health of rivers, lakes and coastal waters.  It stopped
billions of pounds of pollution from fouling the water and doubled the number of
waterways safe for fishing and swimming.  Today, many rivers, lakes, and coasts are
thriving centers of healthy communities.21
To achieve the CWA’s goal of restoring and maintaining the “chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,”22 the CWA prohibits
discharging any pollutant into waters of the United States without a permit.23
In other words, without a permit, “no one is allowed to ‘add’ any ‘pollutants’ (a
broadly defined term including such things as solid waste, biological materials,
and heat) from a ‘point source’ (encompassing all manner of discrete convey-
ances) into ‘navigable waters’ (defined as the ‘waters of the United States’).”24
The two most prevalent types of permits under the CWA that allow for
discharging pollutants into “navigable waters” are the National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit25 and section 404 “dredge and
fill” permit.26  First, NPDES permits are technology based, which means that a
certain type of facility would have the same discharge limitations in any loca-
tion, and the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) oversees these per-
mits.27  For example, a steel mill in one location would have the same
discharge limit into “navigable water” as a steel mill in another location.28
Second, the Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) administers the “dredge and
17 Goplerud, supra note 9, at 7-8.
18 Id. at 8.
19 S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 95 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1511 (1973).
20 Goplerud, supra note 9, at 8.
21 GROSS & DODGE, supra note 4, at 13 (quoting Before the H. Subcomm. on Water
Resources and Env’t of the Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure, 106th Cong.
(1999) (testimony of J. Charles Fox, Assistant Administrator for Water, U.S. EPA), availa-
ble at http://www.epa.gov/ocir/hearings/testimony/106_1999_2000/101899cf.htm).
22 Clean Water Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
23 GROSS & DODGE, supra note 4, at 1-2.
24 Id. at 2.
25 Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
26 Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344.  There are actually four types of permits under
the CWA, but these two are the most prevalent. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 4, at 2.
27 Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342; GROSS & DODGE, supra note 4, at 27-30.
28 GROSS & DODGE, supra note 4, at 2.
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fill” permits under section 404 of the CWA,29 with the EPA overseeing the
Corps and sharing enforcement responsibilities.30  This permit is required
before anyone can place fill material in “navigable water.”31  These section 404
“dredge and fill” permits have become controversial when applied to the filling
of wetlands because of the tension between protecting important wetlands and
allowing for development of privately-owned land.32  However, the only waters
subject to NPDES and section 404 “dredge and fill” permits are those waters
that fall within the scope of “navigable waters” under the CWA.33
B. The Regulations of the Army Corps of Engineers and the Scope of
“Navigable Waters”
Although the CWA defines “navigable waters” as “the waters of the
United States, including the territorial seas,”34 the Corps has made regulations
that further define its scope under section 404 of the CWA.35  Initially, the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 gave the Corps jurisdiction to oversee “naviga-
ble waters,” although this jurisdiction only extended to those waters that were
navigable-in-fact.36  “Navigable-in-fact” waters include those waters that “are
used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways
for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the
customary modes of trade and travel on water.”37  However, whereas the pur-
pose of the Rivers and Harbors Act was to keep waterways free for navigation,
in the CWA, “Congress broadened the Corps’ mission to include the purpose of
protecting the quality of our Nation’s waters for esthetic, health, recreation, and
environmental uses.”38
Although the CWA seems to broaden the definition of “navigable waters,”
the extent of the Corps’ jurisdiction over “the waters of the United States”
remains uncertain.39  Initially, in 1972, the Corps’ regulations construed the
CWA’s “the waters of the United States” to cover only those waters that fit the
traditional definition of navigable waters (or those that were navigable-in-
29 Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344; GROSS & DODGE, supra note 4, at 2.
30 Hearing, supra note 1, at 5-6 (statement of Benjamin H. Grumbles, Assistant Administra-
tor for Water, EPA, and John Paul Woodley, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil
Works, Department of the Army), available at http://epw.senate.gov/109th/Grumbles_
Woodley_Testimony.pdf.
31 GROSS & DODGE, supra note 4, at 2.  However, exempt from the requirement of a section
404 permit are several categories of activities, including normal farming, ranching, dam and
bridge maintenance, construction of forest and farm roads, and certain types of irrigation
systems. Id. at 82-83 (citing Clean Water Act § 404(f), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)).
32 Id. at 2.
33 Hearing, supra note 1 (testimony of William W. Buzbee), available at http://epw.senate.
gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=C3fa969f-23f4-480c-8be7-8f
327e12afd3.
34 Clean Water Act § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
35 See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2006).
36 See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 406 (1940); The Daniel
Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870).
37 The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563.
38 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 531
U.S. 159, 175 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39 See generally Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
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fact).40  The Corps expanded this definition in 1975 to include tributaries of
navigable-in-fact waters, interstate waters and tributaries to those waters, and
non-navigable intrastate waters of which the use or misuse could impact inter-
state commerce.41  These regulations also expanded the definition to include
freshwater wetlands adjacent to other waters covered by the CWA.42  Although
this definition initially required that the adjacent, covered waterway also peri-
odically flood the wetland before the CWA covered that wetland, the 1977
definition removed this requirement.43
Thus, the most recent Corps definition for “the waters of the United
States” includes traditionally defined navigable waters, all interstate waters,
and
[a]ll other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent
streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows,
playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could
affect interstate or foreign commerce including . . . wetlands adjacent to [covered
waters under the CWA.]44
Furthermore, the Corps defines wetlands as “those areas that are inundated
or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to
support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vege-
tation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.  Wetlands generally
include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas.”45  However, although the
Corps attempted to clarify “the waters of the United States” with these regula-
tions, various cases have arisen questioning the true scope of the Corps’ juris-
diction under section 404 of the CWA.46  Moreover, these cases also put into
question the scope of “navigable waters” for all provisions of the CWA.47
C. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes
In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.48 (“Riverside
Bayview”), the United States Supreme Court concluded that wetlands adjacent
40 The original Corps interpretation of “navigable waters” was “those waters of the United
States which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, and/or are presently, or have been in
the past, or may be in the future susceptible for use for purposes of interstate or foreign
commerce.” SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1) (1974)).  Addi-
tionally, the original Corps regulations also stated that it “is the water body’s capability of
use by the public for purposes of transportation or commerce which is the determinative
factor.” Id. (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(e)(1)).
41 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123-24 (1985) (citing 40
Fed. Reg. 31,320 (1975)).
42 Id. at 124.
43 Id.
44 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2006).
45 Id. § 328.3(b).
46 See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S.
121.
47 Hearing, supra note 1 (testimony of William W. Buzbee), available at http://epw.senate.
gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=C3fa969f-23f4-480c-8be7-8f
327e12afd3.
48 Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. 121.
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to traditional navigable waters fell within the scope of the CWA.49  Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc. owned the wetlands at issue, which were eighty acres of
low-lying, marshy land near the shores of Lake St. Clair in Michigan and adja-
cent to Black Creek, a navigable water.50  When Riverside Bayview Homes
began filling the land in 1976 for the development of homes, the Corps filed
suit in federal court to enjoin the company from filling the property without a
permit.51  The district court found the Corps had jurisdiction over these wet-
lands, but the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that, although these wetlands were
adjacent to “waters of the United States,” the wetlands were not subject to
flooding from a navigable water “at a frequency sufficient to support the
growth of aquatic vegetation.”52  This narrow interpretation of “navigable
waters” arose because a broader view might result in the taking of private prop-
erty without just compensation.53
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
Corps’ interpretation of its jurisdiction to include wetlands adjacent to “the
waters of the United States” was a reasonable interpretation of the CWA.54
First, in response to the Sixth Circuit’s takings concern, the Supreme Court
concluded that just because a regulation may sometimes result in a taking, that
is no justification for curtailing a program “if compensation will in any event
be available in those cases where a taking has occurred.”55  Second, the Court
also disagreed with the Sixth Circuit’s holding that the Corps’ regulations
required that a navigable waterway must flood a wetland before that wetland
gained CWA coverage.56  In fact, the Court held the plain language of the regu-
lation only required a covered wetland be “inundated or saturated by surface or
ground water . . . [and this land supports] vegetation typically adapted for life
in saturated soil conditions.”57
Finally, because of Congress’s concern for protecting water quality and
aquatic ecosystems,58 the Court concluded the Corps could reasonably extend
its CWA jurisdiction over “navigable waters” to wetlands adjacent to, but not
regularly flooded by, traditional navigable waters.59  Deferring to the Corps’
49 Id. at 123, 139.
50 Id. at 124, 131.
51 Id. at 124.
52 Id. at 124-25.
53 Id. at 125.
54 Id. at 139.
55 Id. at 128.
56 Id. at 129-30.
57 Id. at 129 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1985)).
58 Id. at 132-33.  In fact, the Court cited the purpose of the CWA as an attempt “to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” Id. at
132 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982)).  Additionally, in clarifying this purpose, the Court
cited a House Report stating that “integrity” “refers to a condition in which the natural
structure and function of ecosystems [are] maintained.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 76 (1972)).
59 Id. at 135.  In applying Chevron deference, the Court stated:
An agency’s construction of a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to deference if
it is reasonable and not in conflict with the expressed intent of Congress.  Accordingly, our
review is limited to the question whether it is reasonable, in light of the language, polices, and
legislative history of the Act for the Corps to exercise jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to but
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expertise, the Court held the regulations were not unreasonable given the
Corps’ findings that such wetlands may filter water flowing to navigable
waters, prevent erosion by slowing surface runoff into navigable waters, and, in
general, “function as integral parts of the aquatic environment even when the
moisture creating the wetlands does not find its source in the adjacent bodies of
water.”60  The Court further supported this holding by concluding Congress
acquiesced in the administrative construction of the CWA because the House
and Senate had extensively considered proposals to limit “navigable waters”
and proponents of a change did not want to remove wetlands altogether.61
Thus, the Court held that the term “navigable” was “of limited import” and
Congress did in fact intend to use its Commerce Clause power to regulate at
least some waters that are not navigable under the traditional definition.62
D. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers
In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers63 (“SWANCC”), the Supreme Court concluded the Corps’
CWA jurisdiction over “navigable waters” did not extend to isolated, intrastate
ponds that are not adjacent to traditionally defined navigable waters.64  The
SWANCC waters were permanent and seasonal ponds located on 533-acres in
Illinois and developed from the remaining pits of a sand and gravel mining
operation abandoned in approximately 1960.65  More recently, when a consor-
tium of Illinois municipalities bought this land for the disposal of baled nonhaz-
ardous solid waste, the Corps did not consider these ponds “wetlands” but
asserted jurisdiction under the “Migratory Bird Rule.”66  This Rule, which
extended the Corps’ section 404 jurisdiction to intrastate waters that are habi-
tats for migratory birds crossing state lines, applied because the Corps found
that approximately 121 bird species, including many requiring an aquatic envi-
ronment, had been observed at the site.67  Further, the Corps eventually refused
to issue a section 404 permit because the municipalities had not established that
this was the least damaging alternative, they had not set aside enough funds to
not regularly flooded by rivers, streams, and other hydrographic features more conventionally
identifiable as “waters.”
Id. at 131 (citations omitted) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)).
60 Id. at 134-35.
61 Id. at 136-38.
62 Id. at 133.
63 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 531
U.S. 159 (2001).
64 Id. at 162.
65 Id. at 163.
66 Id. at 163-64.
67 Id. at 164.  Specifically, the Migratory Bird Rule extended the Corps’ jurisdiction to
intrastate waters:
a. Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird Treaties; or
b. Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which cross state lines; or
c. Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered species; or
d. Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
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remediate leaks, and the project’s damage on area-sensitive species was
unmitigatable.68
Following this permit denial, the municipalities challenged the Corps’
CWA jurisdiction in court, but both the district court and Seventh Circuit ruled
in favor of the Corps.69  The Seventh Circuit held Congress had the authority to
regulate these types of waters under the cumulative impact doctrine.70  Because
millions of Americans cross state lines each year to hunt and observe migratory
birds and spend over a billion dollars to do so, destruction of the habitats of
migratory birds would have a substantial aggregate effect on interstate com-
merce.71  Thus, as the CWA reaches all waters allowed by the Commerce
Clause, the Seventh Circuit ruled the Corps’ Migratory Bird Rule was a reason-
able interpretation of the CWA.72
Subsequently, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, reversed,
holding the Migratory Bird Rule exceeded the authority granted to the Corps
under the CWA.73  First, the Court disagreed with the Corps’ argument that
Congress acquiesced to the Migratory Bird Rule because this Rule did not
appear until 1986, nine years after the alleged 1977 acquiescence, and those
congressional debates centered on wetlands, not isolated waters.74  Second,
although the Court acknowledged Riverside Bayview’s holding that navigable
waters under the CWA included more than the traditional definition of the
term, the Court concluded the term “navigable” still has some importance.75
Finally, contrary to the Corps’ recommendation, the Court did not extend Chev-
ron76 deference in this case because the Migratory Bird Rule would invoke the
outer limits of Congress’s power.77  As the Court found no “clear indication
that Congress intended” the CWA to reach an isolated pond and such coverage
would impede the states’ power over land and water, the Court held the Migra-
tory Bird Rule exceeded the Corps’ CWA jurisdiction.78
On the other hand, Justice Stevens, in a dissent joined by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, concluded the Corps’ interpretation of the CWA was
68 Id. at 165.
69 Id. at 165-66.
70 Id. at 166.  The Seventh Circuit defined the cumulative impact doctrine as when “a single
activity that itself has no discernible effect on interstate commerce may still be regulated if
the aggregate effect of that class of activity has a substantial impact on interstate commerce.”
Id. (quoting Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 191
F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 1999)).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 161-62.
74 Id. at 170.
75 Id. at 172.  As the Court stated, “The term ‘navigable’ has at least the import of showing
us what Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting the CWA:  its traditional jurisdic-
tion over waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so
made.” Id.
76 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
77 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172-74.
78 Id.
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entitled to deference.79  Because the majority refused to extend Chevron defer-
ence to the agency’s construction of the same statute involved in Riverside
Bayview, the dissent stated that “[t]his refusal is unfaithful to both Riverside
Bayview and Chevron.”80  Further, although the majority never reached the
constitutional issue of congressional power over isolated ponds,81 the dissent
concluded Congress does have such power under the third United States v.
Lopez82 category of permissible Commerce Clause actions, or those “activities
that ‘substantially affect’ interstate commerce.”83  Although the individual
ponds may not substantially affect interstate commerce, “it is enough that,
taken in the aggregate, the class of activities in question has such an effect.”84
Therefore, because filling isolated waters that provide migratory bird habitats
will, in the aggregate, adversely affect migratory birds and decrease commer-
cial activities, such as birdwatching and hunting, the dissent concluded Con-
gress does have Commerce Clause power to regulate such waters.85
III. RAPANOS V. UNITED STATES
After Riverside Bayview and SWANCC, the next, and most recent,
Supreme Court case to discuss the scope of “navigable waters” under the CWA
was the 2006 case, Rapanos v. United States.86 Rapanos was a consolidation
of two cases involving Michigan wetlands, both of which connected to tradi-
tional navigable waters by a series of ditches, drains, or other waterways.87
Because the wetlands were not directly adjacent to traditional navigable waters,
such as in Riverside Bayview, or completely isolated, such as in SWANCC, the
Court faced the issue of whether wetlands near ditches or drains that eventually
emptied into traditional navigable waters constituted “navigable waters” under
the CWA.88  Although this case was an opportunity for the Supreme Court to
79 Id. at 190, 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  “The Corps’ interpretation of the statute as
extending beyond navigable waters, tributaries of navigable waters, and wetlands adjacent to
each is manifestly reasonable and therefore entitled to deference.” Id. at 192.
80 Id. at 191.
81 Because the majority concluded these isolated ponds exceeded the Corps’ authority under
the CWA, it did not discuss whether Congress had such authority under the Commerce
Clause. Id. at 162 (majority opinion).
82 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
83 The three broad Lopez categories Congress can regulate under the Commerce Clause
include “(1) channels of interstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons and things in interstate commerce; and (3) activities that ‘substantially affect’ inter-
state commerce.” SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 192-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Lopez, 514
U.S. at 558-59).
84 Id. at 193 (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 277
(1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-
28 (1942)).
85 Id. at 194-96.
86 Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
87 Id. at 2219.
88 Id. at 2216-19.  The distinction between “navigable waters” and “the waters of the United
States” is that “[t]he Act uses the phrase ‘navigable waters’ as a defined term, and the defini-
tion is simply ‘the waters of the United States.’” Id. at 2220 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)
(2000)).
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clarify the scope of “navigable waters,” the case instead provides numerous
opinions with no majority and thus no clear definition of “navigable waters.”
A. The Rapanos’ Wetlands
John and Judith Rapanos owned various parcels of land in Bay, Midland,
and Saginaw Counties, Michigan.89  These parcels included fifty-four acres
with “sometimes-saturated soil conditions,” which were between eleven and
twenty miles from the closest navigable-in-fact waterway.90  Within this prop-
erty, three specific sites were at issue in Rapanos.91  First, the Salzburg site
connected to a man-made drain, which drained into Hoppler Creek, then emp-
tied into the Kawkawlin River, and finally flowed into Lake Huron at Saginaw
Bay.92  Second, the Hines Road wetlands site connected to a drain, which had a
surface connection to the Tittabawasse River.93  Finally, the Pine River wet-
lands had a surface connection to the Pine River, which eventually flowed into
Lake Huron.94  For each of these wetlands, the facts were unclear as to whether
the connections to the ditches and drains were continuous or merely sporadic.95
In 1988, with hopes of constructing a shopping center on the Salzburg site,
John Rapanos asked the State to inspect a section of the property.96  The State
informed him that this site was probably a regulated wetland and sent him a
permit application.97  Rapanos also hired a consultant, who found between
forty-eight and fifty-eight acres of wetlands on this particular site.98  However,
Rapanos ordered the consultant to destroy the paper record of wetlands on the
property and threatened him if he did not comply.99  Subsequently, Rapanos
began filling wetlands on all three sites.100  Upon discovery of these actions,
the EPA issued various administrative compliance orders requiring Rapanos to
cease the filling immediately, but he failed to comply with any of the orders.101
The United States then initiated both criminal102 and civil proceedings.103  In
89 United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 632 (6th Cir. 2004).
90 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2214.









100 Id. at 632-33.
101 Id. at 633.
102 John Rapanos’ criminal proceedings began with his jury conviction in 1995 for violating
the CWA by filling in his wetlands without a permit.  United States v. Rapanos, 895 F. Supp.
165, 166 (E.D. Mich. 1995).  After a failed appeal for a motion for judgment of acquittal and
a new trial, the district court sentenced Rapanos to a fine of $185,000 and to three years of
probation.  United States v. Rapanos, 235 F.3d 256, 258 (6th Cir. 2000).  The Sixth Circuit
affirmed, but the Supreme Court remanded the case for further consideration in light of
SWANCC.  Rapanos v. United States, 533 U.S. 913 (2001).  The district court then set aside
the conviction, finding that because Rapanos’ property was not directly adjacent to navigable
waters, the government could not regulate those wetlands.  United States v. Rapanos, 190 F.
Supp. 2d 1011, 1016-17 (E.D. Mich. 2002).  However, the Sixth Circuit reversed and rein-
stated the conviction, holding that despite SWANCC, the United States retained jurisdiction
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the civil case, the district court concluded Rapanos had filled 54 out of 141
acres of protected wetlands over the three sites.104  Because these wetlands
were “within federal jurisdiction” as they were “adjacent to other waters of the
United States,” the district court found the Rapanoses liable for violating the
CWA.105  The Sixth Circuit affirmed as the record demonstrated the existence
of “hydrological connections between all three sites and corresponding adjacent
tributaries of navigable waters.”106
B. The Carabell’s Wetlands
The Rapanos decision also included the wetlands involved in another
Sixth Circuit decision, Carabell v. United States Army Corps of Engineers.107
There, June and Keith Carabell (and Harvey and Frances Gordenker) owned
19.61 acres of land, which contained 15.96 acres of wooded wetlands and rep-
resented one of the last large forested wetlands in Macomb County, Michi-
gan.108  The Carabell property was a triangular parcel, located approximately
one mile from Lake St. Clair.109  An unnamed ditch separated the Carabell
property from the adjacent property.110  The excavation of this ditch created a
four-foot-wide berm that blocked surface water drainage from the Carabell land
into the ditch.111  At one end of the Carabell property, the ditch drained into
another ditch or a drain, which connected to Auvase Creek.112  This creek then
flowed into Lake St. Clair, which is part of the Great Lakes Drainage
System.113
Before developing a condominium project, the Carabells applied for a per-
mit from the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (“MDEQ”) to fill
this property.114  Although the MDEQ issued a permit to fill 15.9 acres in 1998,
the EPA asserted CWA jurisdiction.115  The Corps denied a permit in 2000
because the proposed filling would have substantial long-term, negative effects
on water quality, wildlife, the wetlands, conservation, and the overall ecology
in the area.116  The Corps also concluded that minor negative impacts would
over the wetlands in this case under the CWA.  United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447, 454
(6th Cir. 2003).  Finally, Rapanos’ petition for writ of certiorari was denied by the Supreme
Court.  Rapanos v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1875 (2004).
103 Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 634.
104 Id.
105 Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2219 (2006).
106 Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 643, 648 (“Because the wetlands are adjacent to the Drain and
there exists a hydrological connection among the wetlands, the Drain, and the Kawkawlin
River, we find an ample nexus to establish jurisdiction.” (quoting Rapanos, 339 F.3d at
453)).
107 See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. 2208; Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 391 F.3d 704
(6th Cir. 2004).






114 Id. at 706.
115 Id.
116 Specifically, in a letter to the Carabells, the Corps stated:
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-3\NVJ313.txt unknown Seq: 12  8-AUG-08 15:22
1056 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:1045
occur on downstream erosion and sedimentation, flood hazards and floodplains,
and aquatic wildlife, and that less damaging practicable alternatives were avail-
able.117  After an administrative appeal failed, the Carabells filed action in fed-
eral court on July 26, 2001.118  In a recommendation, a magistrate judge
concluded the Carabell’s property was subject to the CWA because it was not
isolated but instead adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters with a significant
nexus to waters of the United States.119  The district court accepted the magis-
trate judge’s recommendations, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.120
Finally, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in both Rapa-
nos and Carabell and consolidated the cases.121
C. The Wetlands in the United States Supreme Court
In this consolidated case, the two issues presented to the United States
Supreme Court were (1) whether the wetlands in Rapanos and Carabell consti-
tuted “the waters of the United States” under the CWA and, if so, (2) whether
the CWA was constitutional.122  However, because the Court held the Sixth
Circuit applied an incorrect standard to determine “the waters of the United
States,” the Court remanded the case on this issue and did not analyze the
CWA’s constitutionality.123  Although a majority of the Court agreed to
remand, a majority of Justices did not agree on the appropriate standard to
determine what “navigable waters” the CWA actually covers.  In fact, on the
issue of “navigable waters,” the case contains a plurality opinion, two concur-
rences, and two dissents.  Thus, because lower courts are now left without a
controlling test, some courts have applied Justice Kennedy’s one-person con-
currence because he concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds,124
[The] parcel is primarily a forested wetland that provides valuable seasonal habitat for aquatic
organisms and year round habitat for terrestrial organisms.  Additionally, the site provides water
storage functions that, if destroyed, could result in an increased risk of erosion and degradation
of water quality in the Sutherland-Oemig Drain, Auvase Creek, and Lake St. Clair.  The minimi-
zation of impacts to these wetlands is important for conservation and the overall ecology of the
region.  Because the project development area is a forested wetland, the proposed project would
destroy the resources in such a manner that they would not soon recover from impacts of the
discharges.  The extent of impacts in the project area when considered both individually and
cumulatively would be unacceptable and contrary to the public interest.
Id.
117 Id. at 706-07.
118 Id. at 707; see also Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 257 F. Supp. 2d 917 (E.D.
Mich. 2003).
119 Carabell, 391 F.3d at 707.
120 Id. at 707, 710.
121 Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 414 (2005); Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers, 126 S. Ct. 415 (2005).
122 Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2220 (2006).
123 Id. at 2235.
124 See, e.g., N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023, 1029 (9th Cir.
2006) (“[W]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds.” (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977))); see also United
States v. Robison, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1248, 1250 (N.D. Ala. 2007) (mem.) (discussing
that although the Eleventh Circuit adopted Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test, this case
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others have applied the plurality’s test,125 and still others have applied a combi-
nation of both tests.126
1. Justice Scalia’s Plurality Opinion
In a plurality opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Thomas and Alito, proposed a two-part test to determine whether a
body of water is “navigable” for purposes of the CWA.127  Under this test, the
CWA covers a wetland if (1) the wetland is adjacent to a channel that contains
“‘wate[r] of the United States’ (i.e., a relatively permanent body of water con-
nected to traditional interstate navigable waters)” and (2) “the wetland has a
continuous surface connection with that water, making it difficult to determine
where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.”128
In establishing the first element of this test, the plurality defined “the
waters of the United States,” or the specific waters to which a wetland must be
adjacent before gaining CWA coverage, by looking at the plain meaning of the
statute, prior cases, and the purpose of the statute.129  First, the plurality stated
the CWA only allows federal jurisdiction over “waters” and the phrase, “the
waters of the United States,” does not allow for the Corps’ expansive mean-
ing.130  In fact, the plurality noted the definitive article “the” and the plural
“waters” indicate the CWA does not cover all “water”; instead, “the waters”
refers only to water “found in streams and bodies forming geographical fea-
tures such as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes” or “the flowing or moving masses, as
of wave or floods, making up such streams or bodies.”131  Because this diction-
ary definition refers to continuous, fixed bodies of water, as opposed to dry
channels in which water occasionally flows, the plurality concluded “the waters
of the United States” only include relatively permanent bodies of water.132
was being assigned to a different judge because this judge was “so perplexed by the way the
law applicable to this case has developed that it would be inappropriate . . . to try it again”).
125 See, e.g., United States v. Chevron Pipeline Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605 (N.D. Tex. 2006);
see also infra note 210.
126 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2006) (“The federal govern-
ment can establish jurisdiction over the target sites if it can meet either the plurality’s or
Justice Kennedy’s standard as laid out in Rapanos.”).  In his dissent, Justice Stevens sug-
gested lower courts apply both tests so if either test is satisfied, CWA jurisdiction is estab-
lished. See infra text accompanying note 174.
127 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2214, 2227.
128 Id. at 2227 (alteration in original).
129 Id. at 2220-24.
130 Id. at 2220.
131 Id. at 2220-21 (alteration in original) (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DIC-
TIONARY 2882 (2d ed. 1954)).
132 Id. at 2221.  The plurality further supported this interpretation of the CWA by examining
the CWA’s definition of “point source.” Id. at 2222-23.  A point source is “any pipe, ditch,
channel, tunnel, conduit, well . . . from which pollutants are or may be discharged.”  Clean
Water Act § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000).  Because this definition refers to ditches
and channels, which the plurality viewed as having intermittent water flows, and the CWA
also defines “discharge of a pollutant” as adding pollutants to “navigable waters from any
point source,” the plurality concluded “point sources” and “navigable waters” are two sepa-
rate categories.  Thus, only “point sources,” not “navigable waters,” contain ditches, chan-
nels, and other watercourses with intermittent flows.
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Second, the plurality noted the phrase “navigable waters” and prior cases
also confirm “the waters of the United States” include only relatively perma-
nent bodies of water.133  Because the traditional definition of “navigable
waters” relates to those waters that are navigable-in-fact and the Court in
SWANCC noted the term still carried some of its original meaning, the plurality
concluded “navigable waters” contain “at bare minimum, the ordinary presence
of water.”134  The plurality also claimed that nowhere in Riverside Bayview did
the Court suggest expanding “the waters of the United States” beyond “hydro-
graphic features more conventionally identifiable as ‘waters.’”135  Similarly, in
both Riverside Bayview and SWANCC, the Court referred to “navigable
waters” as “open waters,” which the plurality stated does not include typically
dry channels.136
Finally, the plurality considered the CWA’s stated “policy of Congress to
recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the
States . . . .”137  In fact, the plurality noted that the Corps’ expansive definition
of “the waters of the United States” would infringe upon the states’ rights to
plan and develop land and water resources.138  The plurality also concluded, as
did the SWANCC Court, that a clearer statement from Congress is necessary
before stretching the definition of “the waters of the United States” to the outer
limits of Congress’s commerce power.139  As such, “the waters of the United
States” include only “those relatively permanent, standing or continuously
flowing bodies of water ‘forming geographic features’ that are described in
ordinary parlance as ‘streams[,] . . . oceans, rivers, [and] lakes.’  The phrase
does not include channels through which water flows intermittently or ephem-
erally, or channels that periodically provide drainage for rainfall.”140  Thus,
under the first element of the plurality’s test, the Corps only has jurisdiction
over a wetland if that wetland lies adjacent to a body of water that is relatively
permanent and continuously flowing.141
133 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2222.
134 Id.  The plurality noted that the Act’s term “navigable waters” does include more water
than just the traditional navigable waters as defined by The Daniel Ball but reaffirmed that
the word “navigable” is not completely devoid of meaning.  In fact, the CWA provides for
the substitution of federal jurisdiction over that of a state over “navigable waters . . . other
than those waters which are presently used, or are susceptible to use in their natural condi-
tion or by reasonable improvement as a means to transport interstate or foreign commerce
. . . including wetlands adjacent thereto.”  The plurality stated that this provision shows the
CWA covers more than just traditional navigable waterways. Id. at 2220 (omissions in orig-
inal) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(1)).
135 Id. at 2222 (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131
(1985)).
136 Id.
137 Id. at 2223.
138 Id. at 2223-24.  In fact, the plurality stated that it would “ordinarily expect a ‘clear and
manifest’ statement from Congress to authorize an unprecedented intrusion into traditional
state authority.” Id. at 2224.
139 Id. at 2224.  Accordingly, the Court held the Corps’ expansive definition of “the waters
of the United States” is not “based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 2225.
140 Id. at 2225 (alterations and omissions in original) (citation omitted).
141 Id. at 2227.
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For the second element of the plurality’s test, which requires that a wet-
land have a continuous surface connection with “the waters of the United
States,” the plurality considered the Court’s decision in Riverside Bayview.142
The plurality summarized the holding of Riverside Bayview as deferring to the
Corps’ judgment to include those wetlands in the CWA because of the inherent
ambiguity in determining where water ends and adjacent wetlands begin.143  In
fact, in Riverside Bayview, a “significant nexus” existed between the wetlands
and the “navigable water,” and, as such, the Corps was justified in considering
ecological factors to determine the CWA covered such wetlands.144  On the
other hand, when a wetland has only intermittent or remote hydrologic connec-
tions to “the waters of the United States,” such as the isolated ponds in
SWANCC, there is no boundary-drawing problem and, thus, no “significant
nexus” between the wetlands and “the waters of the United States.”145  Thus,
the plurality claimed “only those wetlands with a continuous surface connec-
tion to bodies of water that are ‘waters of the United States’ in their own right,
so that there is no clear demarcation between ‘waters’ and wetlands, are ‘adja-
cent to’ such waters and covered by the Act.”146
Accordingly, under the plurality’s test, a wetland is only covered by the
CWA if it is adjacent to a “water[ ] of the United States,” or a water that is
permanent with continual flows, and the wetland has a continuous surface con-
nection to that adjacent body of water.147
2. Chief Justice Roberts’ Concurrence
In a brief concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts suggested that the Corps and
EPA could have avoided this fragmented and confusing decision by enacting
rules that clarified the outer bounds of their CWA authority.148  In fact, he
stated that the Court’s decision in SWANCC indicated the Corps does not have
limitless authority under the CWA and, after SWANCC, the Corps and EPA did
intend to develop new regulations clarifying the waters covered by the
CWA.149  However, as Chief Justice Roberts noted, the Corps and EPA failed
to develop any rules, which resulted in the avoidable situation in Rapanos and
another defeat for the Corps.150
3. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence
Although Justice Kennedy agreed the Court should remand the case to the
Sixth Circuit, he completely disagreed with the plurality’s two-part test.151
142 Id. at 2225-26.
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 2226.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 2227.
148 Id. at 2235-36 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
149 Id. at 2235.
150 Chief Justice Roberts also noted that “the Corps and the EPA would have enjoyed plenty
of room to operate in developing some notion of an outer bound to the reach of their author-
ity.” Id. at 2236.
151 Id. at 2246, 2252 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he plurality’s opinion is inconsistent
with the Act’s text, structure, and purpose.”).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-3\NVJ313.txt unknown Seq: 16  8-AUG-08 15:22
1060 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:1045
Instead, relying on Riverside Bayview and SWANCC, he concluded a wetland
falls under the CWA’s protections if the wetland has a “significant nexus” to a
navigable-in-fact waterway.152  This “significant nexus” test determines
whether the CWA covers a wetland that falls somewhere in between the wet-
land directly adjacent to a navigable waterway in Riverside Bayview and the
isolated ponds in SWANCC.153  The existence of a “significant nexus” depends
on Congress’s goal in enacting the CWA, which was to “restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters” by
restricting dumping and filling in “navigable waters.”154  Therefore, under Jus-
tice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test:
[W]etlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus come within the statutory phrase
“navigable waters,” if the wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly
situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as “navigable.”  When, in
contrast, wetlands’ effects on water quality are speculative or insubstantial, they fall
outside the zone fairly encompassed by the statutory term “navigable waters.”155
Further, Justice Kennedy discussed the importance of wetlands to naviga-
ble waterways.156  For instance, he noted the Corps’ conclusions “that wetlands
may serve to filter and purify water draining into adjacent bodies of water and
to slow the flow of surface runoff into lakes, rivers, and streams and thus pre-
vent flooding and erosion.”157  Thus, if wetlands are filled, downstream pollu-
tion may actually increase, much as it would from the discharge of a toxic
pollutant.158  Indeed, the thirty-three states that filed an amici brief claimed the
CWA protects those states lying downstream from upstream, out-of-state pol-
luters that the downstream state cannot regulate.159  Although Justice Kennedy
agreed with the plurality that environmental concerns are not reason enough to
disregard statutory limits, he concluded the plurality’s limits to “navigable
waters” do not sufficiently defer to Congress’s purposes in enacting the CWA
and the executive branch’s authority to implement it.160
Finally, Justice Kennedy noted that evidence in Rapanos and Carabell
suggested a possible significant nexus between the wetlands and “navigable
152 Id. at 2248.
153 Specifically, Riverside Bayview and SWANCC
establish that in some instances, as exemplified by Riverside Bayview, the connection between a
nonnavigable water or wetland and a navigable water may be so close, or potentially so close,
that the Corps may deem the water or wetland a “navigable water” under the Act.  In other
instances, as exemplified by SWANCC, there may be little or no connection.  Absent a significant
nexus, jurisdiction under the Act is lacking.
Id. at 2241.
154 Id. at 2248 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000)).
155 Id.
156 Id. at 2245.  Indeed, “[c]ontrary to the plurality’s description, wetlands are not simply
moist patches of earth.” Id. at 2237 (citation omitted).
157 Id. at 2245 (citations omitted).
158 Id.
159 Id. at 2246.  For example, the amici brief noted that “nutrient-rich runoff from the Mis-
sissippi River has created a hypoxic, or oxygen-depleted, ‘dead zone’ in the Gulf of Mexico
that at times approaches the size of Massachusetts and New Jersey.” Id. at 2247.
160 Id. at 2247.
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waters.”161  However, mere hydrologic connection is not sufficient.162  “Given
the role wetlands play in pollutant filtering, flood control, and runoff storage, it
may well be the absence of hydrologic connection (in the sense of interchange
of waters) that shows the wetlands’ significance for the aquatic system.”163
Likewise, mere adjacency to navigable-in-fact water is not necessarily suffi-
cient either.164  Instead, he concluded remand was appropriate for the lower
courts to decide whether the wetlands possessed a significant nexus with waters
readily understood as “navigable.”165
4. The Dissents
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, wrote a
dissent opposing both the plurality’s two-part test and Justice Kennedy’s “sig-
nificant nexus” test.166  The dissent stated that, unlike the Court’s decision in
Riverside Bayview, these “judicial amendment[s] of the Clean Water Act” were
not “faithful to [the Court’s] duty to respect the work product of the Legislative
and Executive Branches of our Government.”167  Instead, the dissent, relying
on Riverside Bayview, stated the Court should have deferred to the Corps’
judgment to treat these wetlands as included within “the waters of the United
States.”168  As a result, the dissent concluded the CWA might not cover all
wetlands, but “it is enough that wetlands adjacent to tributaries [of traditional
navigable waters] generally have a significant nexus to the watershed’s water
quality.”169
Although the dissent completely disregarded the plurality’s opinion and
two-part test, the dissent did conclude Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus”
161 Id. at 2250.
162 Id. at 2251.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 2252.
165 Id.
166 Specifically the dissent stated:
The broader question is whether regulations that have protected the quality of our waters for
decades, that were implicitly approved by Congress, and that have been repeatedly enforced in
case after case, must now be revised in light of the creative criticisms voiced by the plurality and
Justice Kennedy today.  Rejecting more than 30 years of practice by the Army Corps, the plural-
ity disregards the nature of the congressional delegation to the agency and the technical and
complex character of the issues at stake.  Justice Kennedy similarly fails to defer sufficiently to
the Corps, though his approach is far more faithful to our precedents and to principles of statu-
tory interpretation than is the plurality’s.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167 Id. at 2253.
168 In fact, the dissent stated:
The Army Corps has determined that wetlands adjacent to tributaries of traditionally navigable
waters preserve the quality of our Nation’s waters by, among other things, providing habitat for
aquatic animals, keeping excessive sediment and toxic pollutants out of adjacent waters, and
reducing downstream flooding by absorbing water at times of high flow.  [Thus, the Corps’
treatment of wetlands as] ‘waters of the United States’ is a quintessential example of the Execu-
tive’s reasonable interpretation of a statutory provision.
Id. at 2252 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-45 (1984)).
169 Id. at 2258.
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test likely would not diminish the quantity of wetlands covered by the CWA.170
However, the dissent stated this test would create additional work for all parties
involved and developers wishing to fill a wetland would have no sure way of
knowing whether they need a section 404 permit.171  Instead, the Corps would
have to make a case-by-case inquiry for each wetland, thereby increasing time
and resources involved in the permit application process.172  Thus, the dissent
would continue to defer to the Corps as the Court did in Riverside Bayview.173
However, because this opinion is not controlling, the dissent suggested that on
remand, the lower courts should uphold the Corps’ jurisdiction under either the
plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test.174
Additionally, Justice Breyer wrote a brief dissent suggesting the Corps
should quickly develop new regulations.175  In fact, he stated that Congress
intended the Corps to make the technical judgments that form the basis of these
types of wetlands cases.176  However, without updated regulations, “courts will
have to make ad hoc determinations that run the risk of transforming scientific
questions into matters of law.”177
IV. APPLICATION OF RAPANOS IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT
A. Wastewater Dumping in Northern California River Watch v. City of
Healdsburg
Two months after the Supreme Court decided the Rapanos case, the Ninth
Circuit applied it in Northern California River Watch v. City of Healdsburg
(“River Watch”).178  In River Watch, the wetlands at issue included the Basalt
Pond located next to the Russian River, which is a traditionally defined naviga-
ble water.179  The pond was originally created when a pit from a 1960s excava-
tion project filled up to the water table line of the surrounding aquifer.180  The
pond and Russian River were separated by a levee and distances of fifty to
several hundred feet, and the levee typically prevented a surface connection
between the two bodies.181  When the City began to dump sewage into the
Basalt Pond without obtaining an NPDES permit under the CWA, an environ-
mental group sued in federal court.182  The district court based its decision on
Riverside Bayview and held that “discharges into the Pond are discharges into
the Russian River, a navigable water of the United States protected by the
CWA.”183  However, because the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of River-
170 Id. at 2259-64.
171 Id. at 2264-65.
172 Id. at 2265.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 2266 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
176 Id.
177 Id. 
178 N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2006).
179 Id. at 1026.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 1025-26.
183 Id. at 1025.
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side Bayview in Rapanos, the Ninth Circuit reviewed this case under Justice
Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test.184
Under the “significant nexus” test, the Ninth Circuit held the Basalt Pond
affected the “chemical, physical, and biological integrity” of the Russian River,
thereby justifying CWA protection for the Basalt Pond.185  First, the Basalt
Pond affected the chemical integrity of the Russian River because the City’s
sewage discharges into the pond caused an increase in chloride levels in the
river.186  Second, although the court stated that mere adjacency to a navigable
water is not sufficient, the pond and river were physically connected by occa-
sional surface overflow and an underground aquifer.187  In fact, at least twenty-
six percent of the pond’s volume reached the river each year.188  Finally, a
biological, or ecological, connection existed because the pond and its wetlands
supported wildlife, including birds, mammals, and fish, that are “an integral
part of and indistinguishable from the rest of the Russian River ecosystem.”189
Thus, because the pond affected the river on a chemical, physical, and biologi-
cal level, a significant nexus between the two existed, and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed that the City violated the CWA by not obtaining a CWA permit.190
A year later, in 2007, the River Watch case returned to the Ninth Circuit,
where the court affirmed that CWA jurisdiction existed under Justice Ken-
nedy’s “significant nexus” test but possibly called into question whether this
test will always apply.191  There, the court stated that the “significant nexus”
test was the “narrowest ground to which a majority of the Justices would assent
if forced to choose in almost all cases.”192  Further, the court clarified that,
contrary to what it said in the 2006 opinion, mere adjacency to a navigable
water is indeed sufficient to establish CWA jurisdiction by virtue of a “reasona-
ble inference of ecologic interconnection.”193  As such, the court held that
CWA jurisdiction was established over Basalt Pond by virtue of its adjacency
and its “substantial nexus” to the Russian River.194
B. Altering a Creek in United States v. Moses
In 2007, the Ninth Circuit again applied Rapanos in United States v.
Moses,195 a case considering Idaho’s Teton Creek, in which water only flowed
184 Id.
185 Id. at 1030.
186 Id. at 1031.
187 Id. at 1030.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 1031.
190 Id.
191 N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg (River Watch II), 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir.
2007).
192 Id. at 999 (emphasis added), quoted in Mark A. Ryan, The Ninth Circuit Jumps into the
Post-Rapanos Fray, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter 2008, at 60, 60.  Ryan concludes
this language leaves the door slightly open for the Ninth Circuit to apply the plurality’s test
to a future case with the right facts.  Ryan, supra, at 61.
193 River Watch II, 496 F.3d at 1000 (quoting Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208,
2248 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
194
 Id.
195 United States v. Moses, 496 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2007).
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seasonally.  Although water only flowed in the relevant part of Teton Creek
during the spring run-off, the Teton Creek was a tributary of the Teton River,
which eventually flowed to the Snake River.196  In Moses, developer Charles
Moses continued to hire excavators to restructure and reshape the creek bed
over a period of twenty years, even after the Corps repeatedly warned him to
stop.197  Finally, after disobeying an EPA administrative compliance order,
Moses was indicted, found guilty for violating the CWA, and sentenced to
eighteen months in prison and a $9000 fine.198  On appeal, one of his argu-
ments was that the portion of Teton Creek he manipulated was not a water of
the United States under the CWA.199
Examining Rapanos, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the CWA cov-
ers intermittent streams that empty into “the waters of the United States” and
concluded that “the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that intermittent
streams (at least those that are seasonal) can be waters of the United States.”200
The Ninth Circuit noted that even though the plurality considered “the waters
of the United States” to be relatively permanent and continuously flowing, foot-
note five of the plurality opinion stated that “[w]e also do not necessarily
exclude seasonal rivers, which contain continuous flow during some months of
the year but no flow during dry months.”201  Further, because both Justice Ken-
nedy and the dissenting opinion concluded that impermanent streams could be
covered by the CWA, jurisdiction in this case was appropriate.202
As one commentator noted, the Moses decision applied a broad approach
to the CWA and Rapanos.203  For instance, the Moses court stated, “There can
be little doubt that a tributary of waters of the United States is itself a water of
the United States.”204  Further, the court concluded a waterway always retains
status as a water of the United States, even if it later dries up.205  This has
implications for the arid western states where streams are often intermittent and
might imply how the Ninth Circuit would apply the CWA to “dry”
riverbeds.206
V. ANALYSIS:  CLARIFYING “NAVIGABLE WATERS”
Although cases such as River Watch are seemingly straightforward cases
in which to apply Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test, many other cases,
196 Id. at 985.
197 Id. at 986.
198 Id. at 987.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 989, 991.
201 Id. at 990 (quoting Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2221 n.5 (2006)); see also
Ryan, supra note 192, at 61 (noting that although Justice Scalia states that intermittent
streams are not covered by the CWA, he “thoroughly confuses this point in footnote 5 of the
Rapanos decision by stating that ‘seasonal streams’ are subject to the CWA”).
202 Moses, 496 F.3d at 990-91.
203 Ryan, supra note 192, at 61.
204 Moses, 496 F.3d at 988 n.8, quoted in Ryan, supra note 192, at 61.
205 Id. at 989, cited in Ryan, supra note 192, at 61.
206 Ryan, supra note 192, at 61; see also infra Part V.C. (discussing the implications of
CWA jurisdiction on the arid western states).
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including cases similar to Moses, will likely be much more difficult.207  For
instance, on remand to the Sixth Circuit, the Corps will now need to show how
the wetlands on both the Rapanos and Carabell properties relate chemically,
physically, and biologically to the nearby navigable waterways.208  Although
Justice Kennedy did note that some evidence was already found by an expert in
the lower courts,209 more will likely be needed, thereby increasing costs for the
Corps and both the Rapanoses and Carabells.  Further, there is no guarantee
that a court will even apply the “significant nexus” test because a court could
instead apply the plurality’s test or a combination of the two.210  Thus, the
court application of Rapanos has been, and will continue to be, confusing.  On
the other hand, if the Corps develops new regulations or Congress develops
CWA amendments clarifying “the waters of the United States,” costs could
decrease for both the government and individuals.211  With new regulations or
legislation, the Corps or Congress could also ensure the protection of wetlands,
especially in arid western states, in pursuit of restoring and maintaining “the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”212  Simi-
larly, new regulations or legislation concentrating on the protection of wetlands
could further the Bush Administration’s goal of achieving an overall increase
of the nation’s wetlands each year.213
207 See Kristina Daniel Lawson, Troubled Waters:  The Supreme Court Splits on Scope of
Wetlands Regulation, MILLER & STARR REAL ESTATE NEWSALERT, Sept. 2006, at 1, 7-8,
available at http://msrlegal.com/pdf/MSR_Sep06_NewsAlert.pdf.
With respect to the Clean Water Act generally, the ideological fracture in the Court, coupled
with Section 404’s truly ambiguous language, now requires the United States Army Corps of
Engineers make every effort to adopt a reasonable regulation defining the scope of its jurisdic-
tion over non-adjacent and separated wetlands.  Should the Corps decline to do so, Congress
should intervene and explain what it meant when it said “navigable waters” are “the waters of the
United States.”  Without such clarification, it may be only a short time before another Section
404 case reaches the Supreme Court.
208 Id. at 7 (“The tale is not over for the Rapanoses or the Carabells; they will need to press
on in the Sixth Circuit.”).
209 Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2250 (2006) (Kennedy, J. concurring).
210 Indeed, with the splintered Rapanos decision, courts may or may not apply Justice Ken-
nedy’s test.  For example, in United States v. Chevron Pipeline Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605
(N.D. Tex. 2006), the court applied the plurality’s two-part test. See Mark Squillace, From
“Navigable Waters” to “Constitutional Waters”:  The Future of Federal Wetlands Regula-
tion, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 799, 848-50 (2007) (discussing the Chevron Pipeline case
and noting how the court even seemed to apply the plurality’s opinion incorrectly); supra
notes 191-92 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 66 (1st
Cir. 2006) (“The federal government can establish jurisdiction over the target sites if it can
meet either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s standard as laid out in Rapanos.”).
211 If the regulations or legislation were more straightforward, both parties would have a
better sense of what waters the CWA actually covered, and, thus, less money would be spent
proving and arguing for a particular side. Cf. David Sunding & David Zilberman, The Eco-
nomics of Environmental Regulation by Licensing:  An Assessment of Recent Changes to the
Wetland Permitting Process, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 59, 81 (2002) (“[O]ver $1.7 billion is
spent each year by the private and public sectors obtaining wetlands permits for residential
and public sector activities.”).
212 Clean Water Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
213 Specifically, as of 2004, “[t]he President’s goal is to restore, improve and protect at least
three million additional acres of wetlands over the next five years.”  Press Release, EPA,
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A. Clarifying the Corps’ Regulations:  Too Late to Be Completely Effective
Because the Supreme Court’s Rapanos decision narrows the scope of the
Corps’ jurisdiction under the CWA but does not clarify the specific limits of
this jurisdiction, the Corps has an opportunity to clarify its own limits through
new regulations.214  Although the Corps and EPA attempted to clarify this
jurisdiction after the Supreme Court’s SWANCC decision, as Chief Justice
Roberts noted, this attempt failed.215  Thus, because of the uncertainties of pro-
ceeding under the plurality’s test or the case-by-case analysis required by Jus-
tice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test,216 the Corps could clarify at least the
limits to the scope of its jurisdiction under the CWA through new regula-
tions.217  In doing so, the Corps would have to be faithful to Riverside Bayview,
SWANCC, and Rapanos.218
In developing new regulations, the Corps has some guidance from Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion:
Through regulations or adjudication, the Corps may choose to identify categories of
tributaries that, due to their volume of flow (either annually or on average), their
proximity to navigable waters, or other relevant considerations, are significant
enough that wetlands adjacent to them are likely, in the majority of cases, to perform
important functions for an aquatic system incorporating navigable waters.219
As one commentator noted, “This open invitation should induce the Corps to
initiate a rulemaking along the suggested lines.”220  Moreover, although Justice
Kennedy concluded mere adjacency to a navigable water’s tributary is not
enough to establish jurisdiction, he suggested that both tributaries of tradition-
ally defined navigable waters and wetlands adjacent to them could fall under
CWA coverage.221  However, without more specific standards, these types of
cases now require case-by-case analysis.222
Bush Administration Commits to Increasing Wetlands Nationwide (Apr. 22, 2004), availa-
ble at 2004 WL 865878.
214 Indeed, as one commentator stated, after Rapanos, “the Corps is likely to enjoy a rela-
tively free hand in establishing new limits on its own jurisdiction.”  Matthew A. Macdonald,
Case Comment, Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 332 (2007).
215 Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2235-36 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
216 Justice Kennedy’s test does add new language that lawyers and permit seekers will
attempt to use to their advantage.  Thus, “[w]ith increased industry and developer pressure,
the risk is that the Army Corps will too readily fold, declining jurisdiction where it antici-
pates litigation or a strong regulatory challenge.  Vast swaths of hugely important wetlands
and tributaries around the country are at risk.” Hearing, supra note 1 (testimony of William
W. Buzbee), available at http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&
FileStore_id=C3fa969f-23f4-480c-8be7-8f327e12afd3.
217 See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2266 (Breyer, J., dissenting); supra note 175 and accompany-
ing text.
218
“Adopting a regulatory interpretation that is potentially at odds with Rapanos and
SWANCC is not in the interest of the regulated community nor does it best serve the cause of
wetland conservation.  Refusing to abide [by these decisions] is a recipe for further litigation,
court losses, and regulatory uncertainty.” Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Jonathan H.
Adler), available at http://epw.senate.gov/109th/Adler_Testimony.pdf.
219 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
220 Lawson, supra note 207, at 7.
221 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248-49 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
222 Id. at 2249.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-3\NVJ313.txt unknown Seq: 23  8-AUG-08 15:22
Spring 2008] WESTERN WETLANDS IN JEOPARDY 1067
Indeed, a year after the Rapanos decision, the Corps and EPA offered
informal “guidance” to clarify their CWA jurisdiction under either the plural-
ity’s two-part test or Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test.223  Specifi-
cally, the Corps and EPA declared that they will assert jurisdiction over
traditional navigable waters, wetlands adjacent to those waters, non-navigable
tributaries that have continuous or at least seasonal flows, and wetlands that
directly abut such tributaries.224  Further, applying Justice Kennedy’s “signifi-
cant nexus” test, the Corps and EPA also will “assert jurisdiction over non-
navigable, not relatively permanent tributaries and their adjacent wetlands
where such tributaries and wetlands have a significant nexus to a traditional
navigable water.”225  To determine the existence of a “significant nexus,” the
Corps and EPA will look to hydrologic and ecologic factors, such as volume of
water, proximity to a traditional navigable water, rainfall, and potential to carry
and trap pollutants.226  On the other hand, the Corps and EPA generally will
not assert jurisdiction over swales or erosional features, or ditches that merely
drain uplands and do not have relatively permanent water flows.227
Although this guidance does clarify some of the confusion caused by the
fractured Rapanos decision, this is only informal guidance, not a notice and
comment rule, and whether jurisdiction exists is still confusing for those waters
that fall somewhere between SWANCC’s isolated ponds and Riverside
Bayview’s adjacent waterways.228  Further, neither this guidance nor a new set
of regulations would likely alleviate litigation.229  First, new regulations adher-
223 EPA, Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in
Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States (June 5, 2007), available at http://
www.usace.army.mil/cw/cecwo/reg/cwa_guide/rapanos_guide_memo.pdf; see also Ryan,
supra note 192, at 61 (“[T]he recently issued Joint Guidance on Rapanos from the [EPA]
and the [Corps] allows jurisdiction to be established if either the Scalia or the Kennedy test
is satisfied.”); Joshua C. Thomas, Note, Clearing the Muddy Waters? Rapanos and the Post-
Rapanos Clean Water Act Jurisdictional Guidance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1491, 1525-28 (2008)
(describing the guidance in detail and stating that “[t]he guidance indicates that the Corps
will do exactly what Justice Stevens suggested:  assert jurisdiction if either Scalia’s or Ken-
nedy’s criteria are met”).
224 EPA, supra note 223, at 1, 4-6.
225 Id. at 7.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 1.
228 Thomas, supra note 223, at 1530-31 (“While it does follow the Court’s splintered
attempt to sort out the jurisdictional muddle, the guidance really only confirms what we
already knew:  relatively permanent tributaries and wetlands physically connected to them
are regulable under the CWA; isolated wetlands with no connection whatsoever to navigable
waters are not.  The difficult decisions are those involving nonpermanent or semipermanent
tributaries and wetlands that are not physically connected but nevertheless bear some rela-
tionship to nearby regulable waters.” (footnote omitted)); see also James Murphy & Stephen
M. Johnson, Significant Flaws:  Why the Rapanos Guidance Misinterprets the Law, Fails to
Protect Waters, and Provides Little Certainty, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 431, 446-55
(2007) (discussing many problems with the guidance).
229 See Hearing, supra note 1 (testimony of William W. Buzbee), available at http://epw.
senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=C3fa969f-23f4-480c-
8be7-8f327e12afd3 (“Any significant cutting back on protected waters would deserve judi-
cial rejection and legislative criticism.  It would also surely engender litigation. . . .  [A]ny
changes of a strengthening sort would still provoke litigation challenging either new regula-
tions or case-specific regulatory judgments.”).
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ing to Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test would be very open-ended
requiring detailed case-by-case analysis.  Thus, even if the Corps makes a seri-
ous attempt to find the chemical, physical, and biological connections, or lack
thereof, between a wetland or tributary and a navigable water, the landowners
will likely contest the finding.  In fact, with such a factual and subjective test,
this analysis will be ripe for litigation.  Second, if the Corps tries to be more
specific about the extent of its jurisdiction, landowners will also likely sue on
the basis that this exceeds the bounds of the Corps’ jurisdiction under the CWA
and Rapanos.  Further, although the Corps could attempt to set out a more
specific “significant nexus” test, perhaps based on numerical values or quantity
levels of a water source, this is unlikely to be successful because of the expan-
sive variety of wetlands.230
Thus, the broad nature of the “significant nexus” test will prove difficult
for the Corps to apply, even with its recent guidance, or to use in promulgating
new regulations.  Although Justice Breyer, in Rapanos, did suggest that the
Corps should not waste any time in developing new regulations,231 it may be
too late to proceed with these.  In fact, with this broad test, the Corps will likely
end up with more litigation that could eventually make it back to the Supreme
Court, or the Corps, to avoid litigation, may not put up the fight necessary to
protect the wetlands that really are important to “navigable waters.”232  Thus,
because it may be too late for the Corps to clarify its own jurisdiction to protect
wetlands fully, Congress should now step in and amend the CWA to clarify just
how far the Corps can extend jurisdiction.  However, if Congress chooses not
to act, or takes long in doing so, the Corps should adopt the “significant nexus”
test in new regulations simply to avoid further narrowing of its jurisdiction by
the Supreme Court in later litigation.233
230 See Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Sen. Lisa Murkowski), available at http://epw.
senate.gov/hearing_statements.cfm?id=260394 (stating that, with wetlands “[o]ne size does
NOT fit all,” but instead “[e]ven [a] casual observer [looking at] the science of wetlands
management rather than the politics of it, must accept the idea that not all wetlands serve the
same function, nor are they equally important in cleaning and conditioning water resources,
nor are they equally important in mitigating storm damage”).
231 Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2266 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting); supra
note 175 and accompanying text.
232 See Hearing, supra note 1 (testimony of William W. Buzbee), available at http://epw.
senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=C3fa969f-23f4-480c-
8be7-8f327e12afd3 (“Administrative agencies like the Army Corps respond to many pres-
sures, but most are risk averse and seek to avoid litigation,” and because the Corps may
easily fold, “[v]ast swaths of hugely important wetlands and tributaries around the country
are at risk.”).
233 See Bradford C. Mank, Implementing Rapanos—Will Justice Kennedy’s Significant
Nexus Test Provide a Workable Standard for Lower Courts, Regulators, and Developers?,
40 IND. L. REV. 291, 349 (2007) (concluding the Corps should consider promulgating regu-
lations clarifying its CWA jurisdiction, as opposed to Congress, which will less likely “be
able to achieve sufficient consensus to pass legislation defining the Act’s jurisdiction”).
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B. A Proposal for Congressional Legislation Clarifying “Navigable
Waters”
Although the Corps could clarify its own jurisdiction under the CWA,
“[a]gencies are creatures of Congress,”234 and, thus, Congress could also clar-
ify the post-Rapanos ambiguities of “navigable waters.”235  Further, a congres-
sional clarification would not just reach “navigable waters” under section 404
“dredge and fill” permits, but would also reach those waters affected by the
release of pollutants under NPDES permits and other CWA permits.236  A con-
gressional clarification would also be a better option because, as the Supreme
Court stated in SWANCC, when an action reaches the outer bounds of Con-
gress’s authority, the Court expects “a clear indication that Congress intended
that result.”237  Although a Corps regulation maybe cannot encroach upon the
outer limits of what Congress could have but has not granted, Congress has the
power to enact any legislation constitutional under the Commerce Clause.238
Indeed, one commentator suggested Congress should amend the CWA to
change “navigable waters” to “constitutional waters.”239  Thus, congressional
clarification of the term “navigable waters” and its definition, “the waters of the
234 Robert R.M. Verchick, Toward Normative Rules for Agency Interpretation:  Defining
Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 845, 850 (2004).
235 See supra note 207.
236 Both section 404 dredge and fill permits under 33 U.S.C. § 1344 and section 402
NPDES permits under § 1342 relate to discharging into “navigable waters.”
Additionally, the Clean Water Act has broad authority over not only the wetlands permitting
program, but also programs such as the Section 301 program governing discharges of pollutants;
requirements to obtain permits prior to discharge under Section 402; water quality standards
under Section 303; and oil spill liability, prevention, and control measures under Section 311,
among others.  All these programs utilize the one definition of “navigable waters” that applies to
the entire Clean Water Act.
Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Sen. Lincoln Chafee), available at http://epw.senate.
gov/hearing_statements.cfm?id=260708.
237 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159,
172 (2001).
238 In 2005, both the House and Senate introduced, although did not pass, bills to clarify the
scope of “navigable waters” under the CWA.  The Senate Bill took the broad approach,
defining “the waters of the United States” as
all waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, the territorial seas, and all interstate and
intrastate waters and their tributaries, including lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent
streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, nat-
ural ponds, and all impoundments of the foregoing, to the fullest extent that these waters, or
activities affecting these waters, are subject to the legislative power of Congress under the
Constitution.
S. 912, 109th Cong. § 4 (2005) (emphasis added).  On the other hand, the House Bill
required CWA covered waters to have a “significant nexus with traditional navigable
waters,” which includes wetlands adjacent to traditional navigable waters or waters with a
“continuous, naturally occurring surface water connection” to a traditional navigable water.
H.R. 2658, 109th Cong. §§ 2-3 (2005).
239 Squillace, supra note 210, at 854-55, 857 (stating that Congress should amend the CWA
because water resources are so integrated and local or state regulations are burdensome on
states when water flows between jurisdictions).
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United States,” would go a long way in defining the Corps’ jurisdiction, pro-
tecting wetlands, and preventing future litigation over the issue.240
If Congress clarified the Corps’ jurisdiction, or at least the outer limits of
that jurisdiction, concerns about federalism and states’ rights would also be
alleviated.  In fact, specifically with section 404 “dredge and fill” permits,
property owners are currently unclear as to whether their property is a wetland
covered by the CWA.241  This may inhibit development on lands not covered
by the CWA or promote the devious type of land filling that Rapanos did with
his Michigan wetlands.  Furthermore, the current, ambiguous phrase “navigable
waters” leaves federalism questions about where federal regulation over the
water ends and state regulation over land begins.  Thus, clarifications from
Congress would alleviate this confusion.
Accordingly, Congress should amend the CWA to clarify what waters are
included in “the waters of the United States” for purposes of the CWA.242  An
amendment should include the more obviously protected waters, such as tradi-
tionally defined navigable-in-fact waters, the territorial seas, and those waters
affected by the ebb and flow of the tide.243  More importantly, though, Con-
gress should include a wetlands protection section that covers those wetlands
that have an impact on waterways that are traditionally defined as navigable or
affect interstate waters.244  By the term “impact,” Congress could clarify that
the CWA covers those wetlands that stop pollutants from draining into, or that
perform some other water purification directly impacting, navigable-in-fact
waters. This analysis would hold true for both wetlands and those waterways
considered tributaries of navigable-in-fact waters.  Further, this use of “impact”
would protect the nation’s waters overall by protecting the wetlands and
tributaries that have a pollution-reducing effect on traditional navigable
waters.245  To some extent, this would be a codification of Justice Kennedy’s
240 See Hearing, supra note 1 (testimony of William W. Buzbee), available at http://epw.
senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=C3fa969f-23f4-480c-
8be7-8f327e12afd3 (stating that four benefits of a legislative clarification include (1) pro-
moting stability in the law; (2) avoiding future litigation over “waters” covered by the CWA;
(3) preventing courts from mistakenly applying the Rapanos plurality instead of Justice Ken-
nedy’s concurrence; and (4) preventing a weakening of protections under the CWA).
241 See Hearing, supra note 1 (testimony of Keith Kisling, for the National Association of
Wheat Growers and National Cattlemen’s Beef Association), available at http://epw.senate.
gov/109th/Kisling_Testimony.pdf (“Both the overzealous government regulation and the
failure to provide adequate notice about the extent of authority to regulate result in serious
infringement of the rights of producers to use their own property.”).
242 See James Murphy, Muddying the Waters of the Clean Water Act: Rapanos v. United
States and the Future of America’s Water Resources, 31 VT. L. REV. 355, 378 (2007) (con-
cluding the “ultimate solution [to the confusion of Rapanos] should lie with Congress” and
“Congress should take action to reaffirm that it intended to cover all important waters”).
243 These categories of “waters” are currently included in the Corps’ regulations. See 33
C.F.R. § 328.3 (2006).
244 See Squillace, supra note 210, at 857-58 (concluding Congress should change the term
“navigable waters” to “constitutional waters,” which “would likely extend the government’s
permitting authority to virtually all activities that could impact water resources”).
245 The importance of wetlands and waterways on pollution is noted in the EPA and Corps’
guidance issued after the Rapanos decision.  In fact, for those tributaries (and their adjacent
wetlands) that are non-navigable and not relatively permanent, one of the things the agencies
look at in determining the existence of a significant nexus is “the extent to which the tribu-
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“significant nexus” test, which requires analysis of the effect a wetland or other
water has on the “chemical, physical, and biological integrity” of a traditional
navigable water.  However, this “impact” analysis would clarify to the Corps,
the EPA, the courts, and landowners the appropriate test to consider.246
Additionally, contrary to the Rapanos plurality, Congress’s clarification of
“navigable waters” should not require a minimum flow or a surface connection
to “navigable waters.”247  First, a minimum or continuous flow requirement
does not protect those waters that may only rarely flow but still have a big
impact on the nation’s waters.  For instance, Senator James Jeffords described a
rainfall of two inches in Phoenix in the summer of 2006, by stating that this
caused
widespread flooding.  Some streams in that region recorded a one-foot increase in
flow over the course of only a few hours.  [He was] certain that any pollution sitting
in those streambeds was washed downstream.  This example shows that even if a
shallow stream flows only part of the year, pollution will still make its way
downstream.248
Thus, instead of requiring a minimum streamflow or regular flow, the
waterway should be analyzed by its impacts on other waters of the nation on an
annual basis.  If such a water does impact downstream waters, as do many of
the streams in Phoenix and much of the West, then the CWA should cover
those waters.  Otherwise, with pollutants draining from these waters, Con-
gress’s goal of restoring and maintaining “the chemical, physical, and biologi-
cal integrity of the Nation’s waters” could never be met or maintained.249
Second, a wetland or tributary’s impact on “navigable waters” does not
necessarily arise from a surface connection, as the plurality in Rapanos also
required.  In fact, such a hydrologic connection between a wetland or tributary
and the navigable water could be from surface connections, either through
direct overflows between the two or via a connecting tributary, or a ground-
water connection, such as in River Watch.  Because groundwater is both a large
and important part of our nation’s water supply, and aquifers often cross state
lines, Congress should not forget these hydrologic connections.250  Otherwise,
tary and adjacent wetlands have the capacity to carry pollutants (e.g., petroleum wastes,
toxic wastes, sediment) or flood waters to traditional navigable waters, or to reduce the
amount of pollutants or flood waters that would otherwise enter traditional navigable
waters.”  EPA, supra note 223, at 10.
246 See supra notes 124-26, 210 and accompanying text.
247 See Taylor Romigh, Comment, The Bright Line of Rapanos:  Analyzing the Plurality’s
Two-Part Test, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3295, 3331-35 (2007) (concluding the plurality’s test
should not be adopted because, although it does offer a bright-line test, it does not further the
CWA’s purpose of “restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters”).
248 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Sen. James M. Jeffords), available at http://epw.
senate.gov/hearing_statements.cfm?id=260402.
249
“Water is transported through interconnected hydrologic cycles, and the pollution,
impairment, or destruction of any part of an aquatic system may affect the chemical, physi-
cal, and biological integrity of other parts of the aquatic system.” S. 912, 109th Cong. § 3(4)
(2005).
250 In an article after SWANCC but before Rapanos, Thomas L. Casey suggests that because
the statute and legislative history are unclear as to the CWA’s coverage of groundwater,
“[r]elying on the language of the Supreme Court . . . leads to the conclusion that ‘waters of
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both the groundwater and the “navigable water” that a particular water eventu-
ally reaches could become polluted by water not covered under the CWA.
Thus, Congress should consider “impacts,” including groundwater impacts, on
traditional navigable waters in a broader sense than is required by the plural-
ity’s opinion.251
Consequently, the focus on “impacts” on “navigable waters” would clarify
the waters the CWA actually covers.  Although the Corps would still perform a
case-by-case analysis, its jurisdiction under the CWA would be clearer.  Thus,
there would be fewer possibilities to fight the Corps’ decisions in court because
if a wetland or tributary impacts a traditionally defined navigable water, it is
covered.  Further, with isolated waters, such as in SWANCC, the term “iso-
lated” would not be as significant because those waters could still be covered if
there was an impact on navigable waters.  Although the CWA may still not
cover the particular waters in SWANCC, it may cover other similar waters that
do have an impact on pollution control in traditionally defined navigable
waters.252  Additionally, with the requirement of an “impact” on traditional
navigable waters, Congress would still be acting within the bounds of the Com-
merce Clause because these intrastate wetlands and tributaries impact interstate
commerce by keeping pollution out of important interstate waters.253  Thus,
through congressional legislation, the states, as well as developers, would have
a better grasp of the bounds of the CWA, and, more importantly, the Corps and
EPA would have a better idea of how to protect the wetlands that are so impor-
tant to our nation’s waters.254
the United States’ include hydrologically connected groundwater.”  Thomas L. Casey, III,
Commentary, Reevaluating “Isolated Waters”:  Is Hydrologically Connected Groundwater
“Navigable Water” Under the Clean Water Act?, 54 ALA. L. REV. 159, 161 (2002). But see
H.R. 2658, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005) (excluding groundwater from “the waters of the United
States” in a proposed bill amending the CWA).
251 In an article written prior to Rapanos, Professor Bradford C. Mank suggests a similar
test based on the “significant nexus” mentioned in SWANCC.  Under this test, “non-naviga-
ble waters must have a perceptible or measurable impact on navigable waters to be consid-
ered ‘waters of the United States.’”  Bradford C. Mank, The Murky Future of the Clean
Water Act After SWANCC:  Using a Hydrological Connection Approach to Saving the
Clean Water Act, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 811, 889 (2003).
252 Kaiya Tollefson suggests such “isolated” intrastate wetlands should be federally regu-
lated because of their contributions to local and regional aquifers, their role in nutrient reten-
tion and recycling, their contributions to the nation’s biodiversity, and the inadequacy of
state responses to protecting these waters.  Kaiya Tollefson, Note, If Marijuana, then Mar-
shes:  Using the “Comprehensive Scheme” Principle of Gonzales v. Raich to Regulate “Iso-
lated” Wetlands, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 513, 513, 535-37 (2006).  Moreover, this note
suggests that, because of the holding in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), the federal
government’s regulation of such waters is permitted under the Commerce Clause.  Tollefson,
supra, at 540.  In fact, the failure to regulate such wetlands will undercut the overarching
scheme of the CWA to protect the nation’s water and the aquatic and wildlife that depend on
these waters. Id.
253 See ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, ENVTL. LAW INST., THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE CON-
STITUTION 113-17 (2004) (discussing how United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), would not limit federal regulation of intra-
state waters under the Commerce Clause because these waters have substantial connections
to interstate commerce).
254 But see Thomas, supra note 223, at 1531-33.  In this note, Thomas concludes increased
agency efficiency, not congressional action, is preferable because the EPA and the Corps
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C. How This Proposal Would Protect Wetlands in Arid Western States
Because many lakes and streams in the arid western United States are dry
for much of the year, these congressional legislation changes would protect
waters that are impacted by these often “dry” waters.  In fact, because of the
desert-like conditions in much of this region, there often is no consistent sur-
face connection between a riverbed and downstream water.  However, as Sena-
tor Jeffords’ Phoenix example illustrates, these “dry” riverbeds and washes can
still impact the pollution of traditionally defined navigable waters.255  Moreo-
ver, besides the occasionally flowing waterway affecting the waters of the
West, and the entire nation, wetlands in general perform important functions:
Wetlands are among the Nation’s most valuable and productive natural resources,
providing a wide variety of functions.  They help protect water quality, reduce down-
stream flooding by storing flood waters, maintain flows and water levels in tradi-
tional navigable waters during dry periods, support commercially valuable fisheries,
and provide primary habitat for wildlife, fish, and waterfowl.  Wetlands are at the
core of this country’s rich natural heritage and are central to its healthy, prosperous
future.256
In other words, wetlands are extremely important to the nation in general as
well as to the waterways that flow through this country.
Additionally, “[m]illions of people in the United States depend on wet-
lands and other waters of the United States to filter water and recharge surface
and subsurface drinking water supplies, protect human health, and create eco-
nomic opportunity.”257  Further, especially in western areas where water is
scarce, protecting the small amount of existing water is vital to the continuing
growth of the region.  For instance, Lake Mead, part of the Colorado River, is
vital to the West’s water supply as it provides water for twenty million people
and millions of acres of desert irrigation.258  As the Southwest continues to
experience large population growth, even more water will be taken from Lake
Mead and other parts of the Colorado River.259  In fact, Lake Mead has already
have the authority to regulate any wetlands under the significant nexus test, unless such a
wetland falls under the SWANCC rule. Id. at 1531-32.  Although agencies are the technical
experts on wetlands and the significant nexus test could indeed provide guidance to the
Corps and EPA, the fractured Rapanos decision causes confusion as to which of the Rapa-
nos’ tests a court will apply when reviewing the action of the Corps or EPA. See supra
notes 124-26, 210 and accompanying text.
255 See supra text accompanying note 248.
256 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Benjamin H. Grumbles, Assistant Administrator for
Water, EPA, and John Paul Woodley, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works,
Department of the Army), available at http://www.epa.gov/ocir/hearings/testimony/109_
2005_2006/2006_0801_bhg.pdf.
257 S. 912, 109th Cong. § 3(11) (2005).
258 Launce Rake, Chasing Lake Mead’s Water:  Deceitful Promise, Shrinking Treasure,
LAS VEGAS SUN, Dec. 29, 2006, at 1.  Furthermore, the water supplies in the West are
important to sustain the aquatic species that also rely on these waters. WILLIAM BLOMQUIST
ET AL., COMMON WATERS, DIVERGING STREAMS 6-8 (2004).
259 The southwestern states of Arizona, California, and Nevada, (all users of Colorado River
water) continue to surpass other states in terms of population growth. BLOMQUIST ET AL.,
supra note 258, at 5.  Further, although western states have been successful in conservation
efforts, including experiencing substantial drops in per capita water usage, total consumption
of water continues to grow rapidly with the population. Id.
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experienced severe declines in water level because of population growth and
severe drought.260  In effect, less water in the river and lake means less water is
available to dilute the pollution that already exists in the water.261  Thus, if
wetlands and tributaries impacting the Colorado River do not receive CWA
protection, even more pollution could find its way into this important water
supply.262  Therefore, protecting the wetlands and tributaries that impact the
Colorado River and other waterways of the West is an important concern that
Congress could advance by clarifying “navigable waters” under the CWA.
Although the Ninth Circuit’s Moses case indicates that perhaps the Ninth
Circuit would protect such dry riverbeds by upholding CWA jurisdiction over
those waterways, that case is arguably broader than Rapanos, and such a ruling
could be overturned in the Supreme Court.263  Further, the EPA and Corps’
guidance issued after Rapanos indicates that those agencies intend to protect
waterways with intermittent flows in the West under the “significant nexus”
test because of the waterways’ important biological and physical effects on
traditional navigable waters.264  However, although these waters are likely cov-
ered under the “significant nexus” test, they are most likely not covered under
the Rapanos plurality’s test.  With this confusion and the possibility of the
Supreme Court changing its mind again and overturning an agency’s exercise
of CWA jurisdiction over mostly dry riverbeds, the agency “guidance” may
only be a temporary fix.  Thus, because this jurisdiction over waterways with
intermittent flows likely pushes the limits of the Commerce Clause, congres-
sional action is essential to assure and clarify that such waterways are protected
even if they flow intermittently.
260 Rake, supra note 258.
261 See id. (discussing how “[p]ollution from Las Vegas wastewater and urban runoff has
become more concentrated than a decade ago” and will likely become worse if nothing
changes).
262 In fact, water quality in the Colorado River “has deteriorated due to direct releases of
sewage and industrial waste; and polluted runoff from farms, roads, mines, mining wastes
and other sources adds salts and contaminants.”  Robert W. Adler, It’s Time to Restore the
Colorado River, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Nov. 11, 2007, at 1D.  Further, unlike restoration
efforts that exist in other aquatic ecosystems, such as Chesapeake Bay, the Great Lakes, and
the Everglades, the Colorado River has been treated as a “huge bucket from which to draw
water for non-ecological uses,” and little has been done to protect its ecosystem. Id.
Although CWA jurisdiction over the Colorado River’s wetlands and tributaries provides pro-
tection over only one part of this important ecological system, it is an important step to
protecting the water supply, as well as the diverse Colorado River ecosystem.
263 See supra Part IV.B.
264 EPA, supra note 223, at 11.
Certain ephemeral waters in the arid west . . . are tributaries and they have a significant
nexus to downstream traditional navigable waters. . . .  During and following precipitation
events, ephemeral tributaries collect and transport water and sometimes sediment from the upper
reaches of the landscape downstream to the traditional navigable waters.  These ephemeral
tributaries may provide habitat for wildlife and aquatic organisms in downstream traditional
navigable waters.  These biological and physical processes may further support nutrient cycling,
sediment retention and transport, pollutant trapping and filtration, and improvement of water
quality, functions that may significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
downstream traditional navigable waters.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Because Rapanos v. United States called into question the scope of “navi-
gable waters” under the CWA, many wetlands and tributaries of traditionally
defined navigable waters may no longer be covered under this important and
successful water pollution act.  In fact, in the arid western United States, where
many waterways are dry much of the year, many important “waters” that pro-
vide pollution protection to major waterways may not receive CWA coverage.
Although the Army Corps of Engineers may be able to clarify its own CWA
jurisdiction with new regulations, the ambiguous and confusing standards set
forth in Rapanos will likely make any changes by the Corps result in litigation.
Consequently, to continue to work towards eliminating water pollution, Con-
gress should clarify the scope of “navigable waters” through a CWA amend-
ment based on a wetland or tributary’s impact on traditionally defined
navigable waters.
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